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Abstract - Since its identification as a unique field of research, 
the modern study of culture has become very popular. Its 
analytical-interpretive power has earned it a place of honor among 
the natural and social sciences, and the humanities. Despite its 
central status, however, the term “culture” itself has not yet found 
an accepted, customary definition. The absence of such a definition 
compels scholars of culture to search for ways to explore the 
discipline they are engaged in. This situation literally blocks 
knowledge of who we are as human beings and how we live, and 
muddles research goals and methodologies. This article aims to 
deal with this drawback. Taking as its starting point Freud’s basic 
definition of culture as the “total achievements and institutions, 
which moved us away from our animal-like ancestors,” and 
organizing this “total” under three analytical categories of taste, 
value, and control — it suggests a coherent definition of culture 
that encompasses most of the existing ones, while embracing them 
under the “rule” of “radical simplification,” conceived by Robert 
Darnton in hard-to-define cases. This may offer a better 
understanding of culture as an all-encompassing human 
phenomenon, and a a more effective means for selecting the 
appropriate methodologies needed for the analysis of relevant 
questions.  
Key Words—Culture; Definition of Culture; “Radical 
simplification”; Relative approach to culture; Normative and 
Descriptive approaches to culture; Essence, Value and Control as 
basic components of Culture; Power and Culture. 
THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUE 
As William Sewell, historian and cultural researcher,
maintains, the great paradox of contemporary cultural discourse 
is reflected in anthropology, the queen of the field, which 
invented the term culture, “or at least shaped it into something 
like its present form,” but because of a “severe identity crisis” 
viewed the question as to the nature of culture as being 
irrelevant (Sewell, 1999, p. 37). It seems, furthermore, that even 
sociology, the birth mother of anthropology, neglected this 
question in favor of other  topics, such as how people make 
choices in their daily lives, and what they draw for this purpose 
from the “cultural toolkit” (Swidler, 1986), or from the cultural 
“repertoire” (Tilly, 1992);1 how individuals build their identity, 
purifying and refining their personal and collective memory; or 
how people  conceptualize cultural phenomena relevant to their 
lives. These scholars maintain that scientists should define 
culture to the best of their understanding. 
 For example, sociologist Ann Swidler (Swidler, 2001) 
defined culture as a “repertoire of capabilities,” which included  
1 Repertoire is defined by Stephen Vaisey, who follows Swidler (Swidler, 1986) 
and Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), as “justifications that rationalize or make 
sense of the choices that individuals make in their lives” (Vaisey, 2009, pp. 
1676).  
symbols of meaning and practices selectively exploited by 
group members in order “to develop ‘strategies of action’” 
(Swidler, 2001, p. 284). Sociologist Paul DiMaggio, who 
distinguished between culture in the private sense and culture in 
the collective sense, related to culture in one dimension as an 
“indiscriminately assembled and relatively unorganized” 
collection of “shared cognitive structures and supra-individual 
cultural phenomena” stored in the memory; and then, in another 
dimension, as “supra-individual” phenomena that hold two 
possible meanings: “as an aggregate of individuals’ beliefs or 
representations, or as shared representations of individuals’ 
beliefs (DiMaggio, 1997, pp. 268, 272).  
Stephen Vaisey defined “culture” at times as “conceptions of 
the desirable,” and at times as “cosmologies,” “worldviews,” or 
“values” (Vaisey, 2009, p. 1676, note 3). Sewell himself stated 
that culture should be understood as a “dialectic of system and 
practice, as a dimension of social life autonomous from other 
such dimensions both in its logic and in its spatial 
configuration,” and also as “a system of symbols possessing a 
real but thin coherence that is continually put at risk in practice 
and therefore subject to transformation” (Sewell, 1999, pp. 88-
89).2  
    Looking at the variety of definitions and the various 
underlying analytical starting points, Motti Regev, a sociologist 
and researcher of Israeli culture, doubts the ability to bridge all 
these and other classical settings, such as those of Sir Edward 
Tylor, Gottfried Herder, Marvin Harris, Clifford Geertz or 
Stuart Hall. Even if a definition is found, Regev stated, it does 
not necessarily become canonical, as is the case with Tylor’s 
approach, where “most of us somehow run around it all the 
time” (Regev, 2009, p. 50). Regev’s proposal is therefore in the 
spirit of Sewell and other scholars mentioned above, namely 
that every researcher ought to look for the most appropriate, ad 
hoc definition, applying it in his research methodology and 
analysis. According to Regev, this approach will be more 
productive than seeking a definition that would be acceptable to 
all and would successfully stand the test of time and become 
canonical. 
    If we take Regev’s, Sewel’s and others’ advice seriously, 
what then is the true advantage of trying to be precise when 
answering such a difficult question — a question that even some 
of the finest theorists of culture have struggled with? Wouldn’t 
it be better to follow Geertz, who thought that the essential task 
2 Sewel’s definition, which is extremely difficult to work with is as follows: 
“. . . culture . . . should be understood as a dialectic of system and practice, as a 
dimension of social life autonomous from other such dimensions both in its 
logic and in its spatial configuration, and as a system of symbols possessing a 
real but thin coherence that is continually put at risk in practice and therefore 
subject to transformation. (Sewel, 1999, pp. 52). 
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of theory building in this context was not “to codify abstract 
regularities,” but to make “thick description” possible, i.e. not to 
generalize across cases but within cases (Geertz, 1973, p. 26)?  
   Even if we suppose that there is a point to this discussion — 
especially since, according to the American anthropologist 
David M. Schneider, culture is the only option left for humanity 
to understand nature and the facts of life, since they have no 
independent existence apart from how they are defined in the 
context of culture (Kuper, 1999, p. 72) — is there a way to 
clarify this “conceptual morass” (Geertz, 1973, p. 4)? Could we 
not do better than the two prominent anthropologists Clyde 
Kluckhohn and Alfred L. Kroeber, who gathered a total of 164 
definitions, formulated during the years 1871–1950 by 110 
cultural researchers, without being able to bond them into a 
coherent definition (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1963, pp. 77-154)? 
Can we cope with the variety of definitions added since Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn’s attempt in 1952? Or, in other words, could we 
crack the riddle of “the most central problem of all of social 
science,” as the Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowsky 
defined culture as early as 1939 (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1963, 
p. 3, note 2)?3
For Kluckhohn, perhaps unfairly slandered by Geertz, there
was no doubt that culture needed an agreed-upon definition. In 
his book Culture and Behavior (Kluckhohn, 1962), Kluckhohn 
described an imaginary discussion between several people 
regarding the need for a clearly stated definition of culture. 
They included a businessman, a lawyer, an economist, a 
philosopher, a biologist, a physiologist, a psychologist and an 
historian; the discussion centered on various questions relating 
to the logic and value of dealing with a matter so abstract and so 
distant from the issues of everyday life.  
At this point, a series of interesting responses emerged. One 
of the anthropologists claimed that defining culture is an 
imperative for man’s endless search for a better understanding 
of the self and of human patterns of behavior in general. Social 
life, the spokesman added, cannot exist without a system of 
conventional understandings transmitted from generation to 
generation and through which a person can evaluate and judge 
himself. Moreover, argues Kluckhohn, understanding culture, 
allows predicting human behavior and understanding its motives 
in depth (Kluckhohn, 1962, p. 68). 
Predicting behavior also creates a better understanding and 
respect for the customs of other peoples with whom we would 
like to come into contact and communicate with, the 
businessman above claimed — thus reflecting Kluckhohn’s own 
views. In this respect, culture is not just “a reticulum of 
patterned means for satisfying needs,” but equally “a network of 
stylized goals for individual and group achievement.” So, if we 
want to predict human behavior, we cannot expect that such 
incentives, even the most primary of them, such as hunger or 
sex, will exhibit similar reaction patterns. A good definition of 
culture can help us predict different responses and clarify their 
characteristics. The issue will be even more significant during 
encounters between people of various orientations and 
altogether different cultures, Kluckhohn summarizes 
(Kluckhohn, 1962, pp. 67-69).  
Other speakers in the dialogue initiated by Kluckhohn offered 
their own explanations as to what a clearer definition of culture 
3 Bronislaw Malinowsky (1939), “Review of Six Essays on Culture by Albert 
Blumenthal,” American Sociological Review, vol. 4, pp. 588. (Appears in 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and 
Definitions, pp. 3, note 2). 
could contribute: the ability of mankind to understand itself as 
part of a cultural continuum, but also the ability to look at this 
cultural variety critically and know what one is or is not part of; 
a better understanding of why certain cultural changes, 
especially the more drastic and rapid ones (for example the 
Weimar Constitution and the democratic political culture which 
it sought to consolidate in a monarchical and conservative 
society) are rejected by society and may even raise tensions and 
disagreements; acceptance of the moral obligation of stronger 
cultures not to damage weaker cultures they come into contact 
with; cognizance that cultural changes may occur without 
defined and implicit logic because no culture is a “self-sealing 
system” or immune to change; a greater awareness that cultural 
changes constantly occur through contact with other cultures 
and through the attributes and pressures inherent in every 
culture (Kluckhohn, 1962, pp. 69-71).4 As evidenced by the 
aggressive support of Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s definition of 
culture, it seems that, despite the difficulties involved, the two 
favorite approaches follow the logic of the well-known 
American psychologist and philosopher Lawrence Joseph 
Henderson, who determined that in science classification is 
preferable to lack of classification, provided “you don’t take it 
too seriously” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1963, p. 77). 
Now that we are convinced that a definition of culture is 
essential, is it not too late? Has culture not lost its validity in 
light of a more comprehensive and convincing concept, namely 
that of power, as Roy D’Andrade postulated in 1999?5 We are 
facing a serious dilemma, especially in view of the harsh 
criticism of cultural studies in recent decades, in light of the fact 
that they are suspected of disclosing a political agenda and of 
the difficulties in consolidating them into a discipline.6 Quite a 
significant group of researchers concerned itself with this 
question.  
Raymond Williams, author, literary critic, and founding father 
of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in 
Birmingham, declared that culture is an autonomous domain 
that stands on its own right, independent of power, and opposes 
the latter’s current, upward trend (Bruce Robbins, Forward to 
Williams, 1995, p. xiii). Stuart Hall saw in Foucault’s template 
nothing more than “vulgar reductionism” and systematically 
refuted Foucault’s own sophisticated positions (Hall, 1996, pp. 
47-48). Eric Wolf argued that if power acquires the status of an
“all-embracing unitary entelechy,” it “would merely reproduce
the reified view of society and culture as apriori totalities.” This,
Wolf explained, is not acceptable, because society does not
respond mathematically to projections imposed on it and is not
perpetuated in a set of rigid social patterns, as seen throughout
history (Wolf, 1999, pp. 66-67). In the course of his study, Wolf
investigated the role of power in three cultures — the Canadian
Kwakiutl Indians, the Aztec, and the Nazis — and came to the
conclusion that, although its presence in society is substantial
and important, power as the social all-controller, is inadequate
4 This ethical contention had strong resonance with anthropologist Adam Kuper, 
who explains that “the reason that we still need the notion of culture is a moral 
one, or a political one. The concept of culture provides us with the only way we 
know to speak about the differences between the peoples of the world, 
differences that persist in defiance of the processes of homogenization. And 
cultural difference has a moral and political value.” (Kuper 1999, pp. 212). 
5 Roy D’Andrade (1999), “Culture Is Not Everything,” Anthropological Theory 
in North America, E.L. Cerroni-Long (ed.), Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 
pp. 96. 
6 See Stuart Hall’s critical review of the failure of the cultural studies in Stuart 
Hall, “Cultural studies: two paradigms,” in What is Cultural Studies. A Reader, 
John Storey (ed.), (1996), London and New York, Arnold and Oxford 
University Press, pp. 32-34. 
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and cannot render the complexity of relations between culture 
and intricate human endeavors (Wolf, 1999, pp. 286-291).  
If we have thus reached the conclusion that it is necessary to 
define culture, and that the process of evaluating culture has not 
diminished over time, perhaps even intensified, it would be 
beneficial to strive for a definition — preferably, a simple, 
understandable, and inclusive definition, readily available for 
effective retrieval. A definition that would allow us to penetrate 
with greater sharpness and clarity this broad domain, which has 
forced itself upon us as a specific academic domain since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth 
century and the rise of nationalism in the early nineteenth 
century, has since then increasingly engaged the attention it 
generated. The model that we try to follow is the process of 
“radical simplification” of Robert Darnton, who tried to define 
what was “revolutionary” in the French Revolution. Numerous 
books have been written on this question, leaving it unresolved, 
however. Darnton proposed the famous formula — and what 
could be more simple than that? - “liberty, equality, fraternity” 
(liberté, égalité, fraternité) (Darnton, 1990, p. 19). Just as Hillel 
the Elder [b. 110 BCE), Jewish religious leader and founding 
father of the House of Hillel, taught the essence of the religious 
Judaic tradition to a stranger who wanted to be converted to 
Judaism, explaining it to him in a nutshell, — “What is hateful 
to you do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah; the rest 
is the explanation; go and learn” — so did Darnton manage to 
instill in the academic community a definition of a concept that 
provided the motivation and inspiration for further research and 
study of the French Revolution (Darnton & Tamm, 2004).  
THE WORK PLAN 
First of all, my own definition of culture will be introduced 
and explained. Then the sources and reasons for the diversity of 
cultures will be discussed. This article will then deal with 
additional cultural definitions, some normative (or “ideal”) and 
some descriptive (or “social”), which our definition seeks to 
include.7 We will also point out a number theoretical and 
methodological insights which the definition yields, and discuss 
how they are consistent with the ways culture appears in our 
academic and everyday life. We will conclude with fundamental 
questions, some old, others new, which now require a more 
detailed investigation. Even though it is somewhat formal, the 
template I present further implies the formation of a humanistic 
approach, both liberal and relativistic (and therefore contextual), 
whose foundations lie in the Berlin School, founded by Rudolf 
Virchow and Adolf Bastian in the late nineteenth century.8  
WHAT IS CULTURE? 
Culture, as I understand it, is the entire range of activities, 
traits, experiences of a person (thoughts, imagination, actions, 
deeds, and behavior) arising preternaturally from his spirit or his 
consciousness. Whatever heats our body to 36.8°C in such a 
7 Williams distinguished between three categories of definitions of culture that 
derive from three modes of cultural research: “the ideal,” which sees culture as a 
process of human perfection; “the documentary,” which sees the history of 
knowledge embodied in imagination and social creative enterprises; and the 
“social,” which refers to culture as the day-to-day human acts as they are 
expressed in and defined by people’s way of life. Our definition will proceed 
according to the three categories proposed by Williams. See Williams, 1961, pp. 
57-59. 
8 At the beginning of the twentieth century, with the arrival of Franz Boas in 
the United States, his school of thought became widely known in the U.S. and 
was studied by a long line of students, giving rise to a serious confrontation with 
both the positivist approach, the cultural hierarchical approach expounded by 
the sociologist Leslie White, and the evolutionary approach of Tylor et al. 
(Moore, 1997, pp.42-52; Kuper, 1999; White, 1975). 
precise, meticulous way is beyond our control. The same goes 
for our rhythmic heartbeats, which are astonishingly adapted to 
so many levels of physical exertion. The various physical 
sensations and instinctual reactions to events we experience are 
usually not under our control.9 Everything beyond this is 
culture. 
These complex elements that make up the individual can be 
classified into three categories: the first includes applications 
that provide the essence of human life, or, if we want, the flavor 
of life as experienced by us. It is classified as taste. The second 
contains all that gives life its worth and meaning, and is 
classified as value. The third includes all that gives a person the 
knowledge and skills enabeling him to handle his life properly 
and meet its burdens successfully; this is the control category.  
We charge these categories with content: complex things we 
do for pleasure; that arouse or thrill us and make us feel 
conciliatory; that give us a sense of physical delight and a 
feeling that we can control our minds — we can go on vacation, 
observe wonderful natural sights, enjoy a morning walk on a 
promenade along a seafront, be involved in sports, watch an 
artistic performance, generate creative work, read a book, have 
positive, albeit imaginary, experiences, meet with friends, have 
intimate contact with a much loved person, and raise children. I 
am leaving out any kind of perverse activity, which for some 
can constitute greatness, leaving this to the imagination of the 
reader. All of the above are aimed to give some taste or flavor to 
our lives.  
Granting value to things through which we seek to guide our 
lives, to give them direction, focus, and justification — such as 
serving God, or a specific principle or ideology, or acts of 
normative (or sacred) value, like helping a neighbor or giving 
charity secretly — is included in the second category. All that 
helps us organize our lives — like work, housekeeping, 
healthcare, schooling, communication and information systems, 
laws, management and research — and enables our private and 
collective existence and necessary, mandatory, social and 
political coordination is identified with the third category.10  
 In many cases these categories overlap (in fact it would be 
unusual if they did not). A musician in a philharmonic orchastra 
will serve as our example: simply playing for his own pleasure 
(even when he does so for his livelihood) would refer to it as 
what gives taste to his life. His way of life as a professional and 
everything connected to his training — from finding an 
appropriate orchestra, to his becoming part of it, from the care 
he gives to his instrument to the way he plans his rehearsals — 
9 According to sociologist Norbert Elias, some emotions, such as nausea or 
feelings of revulsion, derive, from deviations to developing rules of acceptable 
behavior, such as spitting in public,  bad eating habits, contempt and disdain for 
accepted mores, physical distance that is tolerated between people during a 
conversation (Elias, 2000, pp. 72-108, 129-135). Anger, frustration, depression, 
feelings of revenge are increasingly perceived as acceptable behavior, as Stefan 
Zweig shows in his biography Marie Antoinette. Marie Antoinette knew how to 
use such deviations in her favor when she was forced to host members from the 
nobility for whom she had only contempt at Versailles. We know this to be true 
because of the terrifying letters the Empress of Austria wrote to her daughter, 
after she received very accurate information about Marie Antoinette’s behavior 
from the spies planted in Versailles (Zweig, 2002).  
10 Special attention should be paid to language. Some perceive language as one 
of the components for maintaining control (and an expression of effective 
communication between individuals as a condition for the existence of society). 
Culture is based entirely on this. Roland Barthes, for example, claimed that 
“man does not exist prior to language, either as a species or as an individual” 
(cited in Pinker, 2002, p 208). 
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all these are part of the control he has over the activities of his 
professional life (and aspects of his physical existence). The 
dedication of his life to music as part of his religious, 
pedagogic, moral, or aesthetic mission relates to the concept of 
value. The main category, to which we can assign the entirety of 
activities that our artist has engaged in throughout his life, will 
be determined by the relative weight assigned to them. If music 
is a mission, then the musician is dealing with the category of 
value. If it is work or an occupation, it falls into the category of 
control. If the music is, in his understanding, for his pleasure, 
then the focus is on the category of taste. 
Similar features will concern the listeners. The majority, we 
assume, will view it as an existential experience (we can recall 
the brave citizens of Leningrad who, on the 9th of August 1942, 
left their homes and shelters, weak and on the brink of 
starvation after prolonged German bombing, and went to the 
Grand Philharmonic Hall to listen to Shostakovich’s Symphony 
No. 7). Relatively few people will view listening to music as a 
value. Fewer still will view it as an issue of control (for 
example, for developing a greater knowledge of musical 
language, comparison of musical versions, or exposing young 
members of the family to music as an act of musical education). 
Ministries of culture (that is, the state) may view it as a value 
(e.g. for enhancing musical education, encouraging musical 
composition, enriching society, or preserving musical 
traditions), or as control (e.g. employing musicians, enhancing 
the enlightened cultural image of the state, supporting musical 
initiatives of local municipalities in exchange for political 
support, or justifying the very existence of a ministry of 
culture). 
Culture is a unique experience of the human race. In the 
animal world, even at the bacterial level, behavioral patterns 
may somewhat parallel human behavior. Animals quite 
effectively use encoded communication, they develop a 
technology of sorts (chimpanzees use tools, even tools that 
involve various stages of preparation), have the ability to learn, 
use and understand visual symbols or sounds, design tools and 
understand their uses, exhibit behavior that indicates 
compassion, and hint at values such as helping others without 
expecting any rewards (Pruet and Bertolani, 2007, pp. 412-417; 
Rumbaugh et al, 2009, pp. 341-345; Bekoff and Pierce, 2009; 
Hornaday 1922; Hughes and Sperandio, 2008, pp. 111-120; 
Lampert, 2012, pp. 101-112). However, even if we agree that 
some animal behavioral patterns resemble or mimic human 
cultural behavior, it is clear that animals are not dependent on it 
for their existence. This was not true for the human race at the 
dawn of its development. Mankind was forced (or perhaps 
enabled) to disengage from nature and develop survival skills 
that do not originate in nature as such. (Ardery 1976, pp. 134-
139; Lewis 1974, pp. 51-55; Geertz 1973, pp. 49-50). In order 
to prepare mankind for the taxing burden of thought, learning, 
creation, sensual yearning and regulatory behavior, evolution 
tripled the size of the human brain and led to multiple 
adaptations of parts of the body (the face and skull, genitals, 
muscles, fingers) to meet this challenge (Ardery 1976, pp. 95-
101, 138-139; Morris, 1967, pp. 31-49, 50-102; Diamond, pp. 
1992, 32-58, 67-84; Lewis, 1974, pp. 55-59, 65-79, 103-108, 
114-125)
CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
Human cultural diversity is astounding. Its origin lies, on the 
one hand, in the creative power of mankind, of every man 
according to his genetic makeup, to events that affect his life 
and his physical environment, and to the demands placed on 
him by ever-changing social and political institutions, on the 
other (Kluckhohm, 1962; Pinker, 2002,  pp. 23, 142-145, 165-
169, 207-211, 245-251, 306-336, 400-434). All of these, as well 
as the ongoing contacts or confrontations with other cultures 
and within one’s own culture contribute to cultural diversity. 
We are referring to a continuous flow of private and collective 
creativity, voluntary or institutional, which produces at every 
given moment new and diversified cultural contents aimed at 
each of the three areas defined above. To some extent, it will 
remain absolutely private, but it will also evolve over time to 
become a segment of our local, national, or global cultures. 
Most contributions will change or be forgotten, while others that 
are more suitable, more efficient, more aesthetic, more 
encompassing, more familiar, or more easily soaked up through 
propaganda, advertisement or marketing will take their place 
and will become “property” of the human race.  
The jeans, an invention of Levi Strauss and Jacob Davis, 
became a universal commercial product. Its beginnings lay in 
the creative initiative of a small group of private individuals, but 
it is reflected in each of the categories that we proposed. What 
was involved initially was the need for a durable cloth to cover 
the wagons and tents of the settlers of the American West, the 
need for durable overalls and trousers and a preference for the 
color indigo. Over time, these basic needs evolved into 
technologies of textile production and material engineering; 
business and marketing initiatives; the registering and protection 
of patents; the aesthetics of apparel and masculine and feminine 
appearance; the cultivation of a national heritage and 
educational policy; the symbolism of belonging and status; the 
economics of clothing; marketing and advertising techniques; 
consumer availability; protest and infrapolitical opposition to 
repressive domination; issues of changing identity or revolt 
against traditional identity or “ordinary” identity or, as phrased 
by the anthropologist Daniel Miller, a “post-semiotic garment, 
an antithesis to identity” (Miller, 2010, p. 415).11 Similarly, 
even though the production of jeans began as an individual 
initiative, it mutated into a number of public manifestations, 
some of them institutional (fashion, production, marketing, 
advertising, identity, protest, America). In any case, over the 
years it remained a very strong expression of individuality, 
designed according to the tastes, symbolic expression of 
individuality, needs, and even the values of the wearer. It was 
individually fashioned, either autonomously or by way of 
images and promotional pressure, and reflected in each of the 
three categories proposed. 
All developments of materials, tools, instruments, principles, 
methods, ideas, visions, institutions, patterns, regulations, 
agreements, codes, symbols, works of art, performances, and 
forms of organization started just as did the jeans. Each one of 
these evolved as a result of pressures emanating from factors 
that control our existence (thoughts, imagination, passions), 
with the multiple activities they generate, each related to the 
conscious, emotional, behavioral, and material processes that 
constantly affect us as creators of culture. It is man himself, as a 
cultural entity and representative of a specific culture, who 
stands behind this enormous creative enterprise. This fact poses 
a serious methodological and interpretive challenge, eloquently 
11 Benjamin S. Parker, “Pioneer Life,” The Indiana Quarterly Magazine of 
History, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December, 1907), pp. 182-188; Michael A. Korovkin, 
“An Account of Social Usages of Americanized Argot in Modern Russia,” 
Language in Society, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 509-525; Ayaz Mahmud, 
“Prairie Schooner,” Prairie Schooner, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Winter 1998), pp. 72-85. 
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described by the Israeli poet Aharon Amir in his poem “To Be a 
Man.” The poem asks “How is it to be another/ Not me/ How is 
it to be you, he/ How is it to be in your skin/ his skin, her skin, 
our skin, their skin/ How is it to be a citizen of another country/ 
To be raised under a different sky/a different climate/ To be part 
of another nation/ to think, to dream/ to write in a different 
language?” (Amir, 1970, pp. 46-49).   
In the divided global society of our time it is difficult to talk 
about a monolithic human society and “pure,” cultural reality. 
The picture is much more complex. I will demonstrate it by the 
use of a national state model, or what can be considered as “the 
collective jeans.” If in the past the national state emphasized and 
praised the homogeneity of its culture, it lost its appeal after the 
1960s — first in Europe and a generation later in most places 
outside of it — announcing a ceasefire between the ethnic, 
religious, racial, and even national minorities, which had 
previously paid the price of unity by the negation of their 
identity, and thus enabling them a new freedom of cultural self-
definition. This freedom allowed newly identified groups to 
initiate a search for self-determination within the national state, 
in most cases without threatening their existence (Smith, 1981, 
pp. 12-17, 66-63, Smith, 1991, pp. 124-125). Several countries, 
such as Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where there is a large, 
active Indian population (10% of the general population in 
Mexico, 15% in Ecuador, and 55% in Bolivia), have been 
transformed through this process into multicultural and 
multiethnic republics, a process endorsed by their 
constitutions.12 A more radical process occurred in countries 
that were already multinational, like the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, 
and in most colonial countries, due to world political and 
judiciary circumstances rather than for ethnic reasons.  
12 The constitution of the United Mexican States ruled in its second clause the 
following: 
“The Mexican nation is unique and indivisible. The nation is pluricultural based 
originally on its indigenous tribes which are those that are descendants of the 
people that lived in the current territory of the country at the beginning of the 
colonization and that preserve their own social, economic, cultural, political 
institutions. The awareness of their indigenous identity should be fundamental 
criteria to determine to whom the dispositions over indigenous tribes are 
applied. They are integral communities of an indigenous tribe that form a social, 
economic and cultural organization.”  
The Political Constituion of the Mexican United States. Translated by Carlos 
Pérez Vázquez. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2005. 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf 
The first clause in Ecuador’s constitution states:: 
“Ecuador is a constitutional State of rights and justice, a social, democratic, 
sovereign, independent, unitary, intercultural, multinational and secular State. It 
is organized as a republic and is governed using a decentralized approach.” 
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html 
The first and second clause in the Bolivian constitution rules the following: 
“Article 1: Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Pluri-National 
Communitarian Law (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional 
Comunitario) that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, inter-cultural, 
decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality and on 
political, economic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the integration 
process of the country.  
Article 2: Given the pre-colonial existence of nations and rural native 
indigenous peoples and their ancestral control of their territories, their free 
determination, consisting of the right to autonomy, self-government, their 
culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation of their territorial 
entities, is guaranteed within the framework of the unity of the State, in 
accordance with this Constitution and the law.”  
In Bolivia (Plurinational State of)’s Constitution of 2009,  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf 
OTHER CULTURAL DEFINITIONS 
Our definition is one of many, and seeks, like others, a 
concise way to comprise everything that culture contains and 
represents. Can it accommodate all of these and serve as a 
suitable replacement? To answer this question, and perhaps the 
entire question of the essay, I will at first present some of the 
most prominent definitions found in literature. Some, as we 
shall soon see, are normative. They refer to the ultimate of 
human acts and endeavors, and consider them as altogether 
representing culture. Some are more descriptive and omit the 
customary, but ultimately problematic, distinction between a so-
called “high” culture and a “low” or popular culture. Others 
tend to underscore what seems to be more specifically 
behavioral, semiotic, sociological, epistemological, or 
psychological aspects of human endeavor. After presenting 
these definitions I shall return to our basic definition and discuss 
its ability to offer a comprehensive alternative, which over the 
years may become a leading integrative definition. 
Culture, according to the famous English literary critic 
Matthew Arnold, is “the pursuit of our total perfection.” Arnold 
considered perfection as “getting to know, on all matters which 
most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the 
world” (Arnold, 2006 [1869], p. 5). The pursuit of perfection 
reaches its climax in harmonious perfection, conveyed as 
“sweetness and light” (Arnold, 2006, p. 9), which epitomizes 
knowledge, cogitation, wisdom, and sensitivity to beauty 
(Arnold, 2006, p. 52). The pursuit of perfection also reflects a 
“noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we 
found it” (Arnold, 2006, p. 34). There are several conditions for 
the actualization of this pursuit, Arnold added: it should be a 
permanent, not a random act; it should be done within the 
framework of the official state and its official religion, and not 
outside of them; it should not differentiate between man and 
man, between classes, between sexes, or any other human 
categories; its leaders should be methodical, disciplined, and 
open up access to knowledge in all its complexity; and should 
make culture practicable and available to all, even to those who 
live “outside of the clique of the cultivated and learned” 
(Arnold, 2006, pp. 51-53).13  There is an additional condition in 
the pursuit of perfection: it must be peaceful. Any attempt to 
bring about progress by force, by Jacobinic methods — that is 
messianic, political, ideological, bureaucratic or philistine — 
will immediately be rejected. The process must be honest, 
voluntary, practical, and respect wisdom and free judgement 
(Arnold, 2006, pp.49-50). 
“The concept of culture,” according to philosopher Roger 
Scruton “leapt fully armed from Johann Gottfried Herder’s 
mind in the mid-eighteenth century, and has been embroiled in 
battles ever since” (Scruton, 2000, p. 1). According to Herder, 
culture or Kultur was the “life-blood of a people, the flow of 
moral energy that holds society intact,” as differentiated from 
civilization, which “is the veneer of manners, law and technical 
know-how” (ibid.). The German Romantics who followed 
(Schelling, Fichte, Hegel) defined culture in the same way “as 
the defining essence of a nation, a shared spiritual force which 
is manifest in all the customs, beliefs and practices of a people . 
. . an island of ‘we’ in the ocean of ‘they’” (Scruton, 2000, pp. 
1, 3). Culture, they said, shapes and affects language, beliefs, 
13 Arnold attached great impotance to education, which he saw as a humanizing 
process whose aim coincides with that of culture. Se: Lesley Johnson (1979), 
The Cultural Critics: From Matthew Arnold to Raymond Williams, London, 
Routledge and Kagan Paul, pp. 34-38. 
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religion, and history, and influences even the least significant 
events.  
Modern anthropologists, Scruton observed, accepted the 
romantic interpretations of Herder, seeing culture as the 
personification of the “self-identity of a tribe.” Those who 
followed Humboldt, on the other hand, saw it as a characteristic 
of the intellectual elite that strives for what is thought to be the 
best, in Arnold’s terminology. From the conflict between these 
two approaches the concept of “popular culture” arose. The 
phrase was first presented by the literary critic Raymond 
Williams as a critique of the “elitist tradition in literary 
scholarship.” Popular culture, according to Williams, is folk 
culture, a dimension by which the nation expresses its solidarity, 
its identity, its sense of belonging and its opposition to elitist 
oppression. William’s approach, Scruton wrote, paved the way 
for identifying elements of folk culture in all things.  
As far as Scruton is concerned, prominent and common 
culture are inextricably intertwined. Both arise from the same 
spiritual need: “the need for an ethical community into which 
the self can be absorbed, its transgressions overcome and 
forgiven, and its emotions re-made in uncorrupted form” 
(Scruton, p.18). Within its framework, man can morph into what 
Aristotle calls a “man of virtue.”14 In the past, religion provided 
an umbrella for such spiritual needs. Today, Scruton stated, art 
does. Art, or more specifically aesthetics, provides us with the 
sense of salvation that in the past was provided by religion, 
especially through what Scruton called “dynamic communities.” 
The power of aesthetics is its ability to be an “inconsumable 
object” (Scruton, 2000, p. 38), and a value in itself. When this 
value is adopted by man, it motivates him to produce “objects 
replete with meaning,” which allows him to put his interests 
aside and evaluate the state of the world as it is — at least 
temporarily (Scruton, 2000, p. 39).  
The most valuable effect of high culture is to preserve the 
common culture from which it arose as an art form, that is, as an 
expression of ethnic life from an aesthetic point of view, thereby 
perpetuating it. High culture is the culture of enlightenment, a 
culture based on universal values and on imagination and 
emotions. It presupposes the perpetuation of the rite of passage 
from emotional isolation to complete membership in society, 
with full responsibility for the community. It is hence 
incumbent on us to act, as Confucius said, “as if it matters 
eternally what we do: to obey the rites, the ceremonies and the 
customs that lend dignity to our actions and which lift them 
above the natural sphere;” to be in the state of “natural piety” 
described by the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and be 
aware of the enormity of creation and the mystery of time 
(Scruton, 2000, p. 158). 
From a similar point of view, albeit a different perspective, 
philosopher of education Nimrod Aloni (Aloni, 2012) sought to 
renounce all “clean” definitions of culture, which overlook 
normative deviations and insistently try to persuade us to create 
an exemplary human society — a humanistic society, ethical 
and individualistic, that stands behind a definition according to 
which culture is “a combination of excellence of a high 
emotional order and thought in human acts and creation:” A 
combination that is perfectionistic and strives for the sublime, 
14 “A man of virtue” according to Aristotle is a man of good judgment, a man of 
feeling and intuition adapted to the needs of the times, personal and social; a 
moral person with a sense of mission and duty, a self-confident man with vision 
and who adheres to it.  
for the excellence of perfection in human endeavors. A 
phenomenon that has a cosmopolitan outlook and therefore 
strives to be based “on the combination of the spiritual nature of 
man to reach for accomplishments for all humanity;” and that is 
humanistic, as it sets out ways to ensure “the freedom and 
equality of all men,” for developing skills and qualities, hence 
“leading towards a complete and full humane life that is 
deserved and respected” (Aloni, pp. 67-68). 
According to Aloni, this type of culture was inherent in the 
hundreds of years of Gothic culture. Jewish tradition, which 
gave rise to the revolts and wars that preceded the destruction of 
the First Temple, emphasized the need to pursue justice and 
political moderation.15 The Greek tradition emphasized the 
central foundational concepts of arete, and of humanitas or 
paideia. The former encompasses human good will, excellence 
and a striving to achieve one’s full potential; the latter combine 
devotion to the educational process, which prepares man for a 
life of public service and an honorable private life. The Stoic 
tradition, on the other hand, combined enlightenment and broad 
knowledge with a moral principles and strong character, and 
was always willing to defend these values, independently of a 
man’s origin or standing. This tradition stood out, says Aloni, 
during the Renaissance period as well, giving birth to 
Renaissance masterpieces (and to a culture of “great books”); 
later on, during the Enlightenment, the emphasis shifted to the 
elements of inquisitiveness, rationality, the individual, and 
advancement based on initiatives emanating from the human 
mind, and free of the pressure of religion and church. These 
approaches, Aloni stated, project deeply into modern thought 
and contribute to fervid demands for freedom, to creativity, 
criticism, and lofty idealism or, as phrased by Matthew Arnold, 
to the demand for free intellectualism, and normative and 
restrained emotions. 
Such a normative definition of culture, it seems to me, 
summarized the position of the Catholic Church at the Second 
Vatican Ecumenical Council (1963-1965), which dealt with the 
question of Modernism and the Church’s relation to it. In 
December 1965, the fourth and final Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes (joy and 
hope), concluded with the statement that “Man comes to a true 
and full humanity only through culture . . . The word ‘culture’ in 
its general sense indicates everything through which man 
develops and perfects his many bodily and spiritual qualities; he 
strives by his knowledge and his labor, to bring the world itself 
under his control. He renders social life more human both in the 
family and the civic community, through improvement of 
customs and institutions . . . Different styles of life and multiple 
scales of values arise from the diverse manner of using things, 
of laboring, of expressing oneself, of practicing religion, of 
forming customs, of establishing laws and juridic institutions, of 
cultivating the sciences, the arts and beauty.” (Vatican Council 
II, 1965, para. 53). 
For Freud, who combined the descriptive with the 
normative, the concept of culture is the “sum of all the 
achievements and institutions that have differentiated our lives 
from those of our animal forebears.” These, he said, had two 
purposes: “that of protecting humanity against nature and [that] 
of regulating the relations of human beings among themselves” 
(Freud, 1963, pp. 49-50). All of this is based on several 
15 “On three things the world stands: on justice, on truth, and on peace,” 
(Zechariah 8:16). “Truth and justice of peace reigned at your gates”. (Mishnah 
Avot 1:18) 
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components. The first is the combination of all the activities and 
values that “we know,” that are beneficial to mankind because 
they prepare the ground for growth and are harnessed for men’s 
use, protecting them from the forces of nature, teaching them 
how to use tools, to harness fire, to build houses, and so forth. 
The very development of such basic tools enhanced man’s 
freedom of motion and honed his bodily sensations. All this 
made achievements in science and technology possible and, 
unfortunately, as a consequence of mankind’s legendary and 
unending quests, also the ability to destroy the world. At the 
same time, with man’s control over nature, his misuse of it for 
his own needs, his lack of vision in the cultural realm could 
have made it possible for man to exploit space and time 
efficiently and for his own pleasure and mental stability “to save 
unnecessary use of mental energy” (Freud, 1963, pp. 34-58).  
The second component, according to Freud, is the cherishing 
and nurturing of spiritual endeavors, intellectual, scientific, and 
artistic achievements, and of an ideal world (religious, 
philosophical, and ideological). The third facet of culture, albeit 
certainly not the least according to Freud’s vision, is the 
determination of the relationship between man and man and 
between man and society. This is a cultural activity because it 
initially demands a united body, that is, a majority, which is 
stronger than any individual. To exchange one’s power with the 
power of many, said Freud, is crucial since it relies principally 
on a situation when the many adopt the yearnings and urges of 
the few (Freud, 1963, pp.57-59).  
The next demand is for justice, that is, the assurance that a 
law once passed will not be broken in favor of any individual 
(Freud, 1963, p. 59). From here it is a short distance to the 
demand for the expansion of a majority, so that it will 
incorporate all individuals in such a way that all will be safe 
from uncontrolled aggression. Needless to say, that freedom is 
not part of culture because it preceded culture, and therefore 
forces it to maintain a permanent and prolonged dialogue, in the 
hope of reaching some sort of equilibrium. Deeper reflection 
will reveal that culture is actually the story of the restraint and 
encouragement of human desires and their instincts. These on 
their part make an additional cultural demand (besides creating 
commonality and order that are just and lawful). It is 
sublimation that allows for spiritual, scientific, artistic, and 
theoretical activities to play a significant role in cultural life 
(Freud, 1963, p. 61-63). 
According to Freud, cultural process is “the struggle of the 
human species for existence,” a ‘battle of Titans” (Freud, 1963, 
p. 125) and, in a more concrete way, a process expanding from
the family (whose pattern is still determined biologically) to
humanity (Freud, 1963, pp. 103, 121). It is the same compulsion
humans feel in the service of Eros and Ananke — that is, “the
inevitability of [the] unavoidable restrictions” — namely,
abandoning the individualistic for the general human condition,
in the framework of which people are connected with each other
into one unit (Freud, 1963, p. 133). This process demands, as
Freud explicated, great sacrifices from the individual, who also
equips himself with the appropriate mechanisms for dealing
with such restrictions, the most outstanding of which is
conscience (the superego) and the closely connected sense of
guilt (Freud, 1963, p. 137).
The classical definition of Edward Burnett Tylor represents a 
turn to a descriptive, less argumentative, approach in cultural 
research. As far as Tylor is concerned “Culture and Civilization, 
taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society,” (Tylor, 1871, p. 1). This definition, simple as it is, 
had a profound impact and fostered dozens of similar 
definitions. Franz Boas, the founder of the humanistic school of 
American cultural research, found that “culture embraces all the 
manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of 
the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he 
lives, and the products of human activities as determined by 
these habits” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1963, p. 82). It was along 
this line of thought that anthropologist Harry Holbert Turney-
High argued that culture in its broadest sense “is coterminous 
with everything that is artificial, useful and social employed by 
man, in order to maintain his equilibrium as a bio-psychological 
organism” (Turney-High, 1949, p. 5). To this muddle 
Kluckhohn added his own, explaining that culture is a 
conglomerate of overt or implicit patterns of behavior, acquired 
and transferred from generation to generation through symbols 
historically evolved in thought and action (Kluckhohn, 1962).  
The core of culture comprises conventional (i.e. verifiably 
inferred and particular) thoughts and their attributed values. 
Cultural frameworks may, according to some, be considered as 
a result of activity, or, alternatively as a moulding of 
components of further activity (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 
181). 
Geertz, discouraged by the multitude of definitions and their 
eclectic nature, sought to find a comprehensive definition of his 
own that would challenge the existent eclecticism. To achieve 
this, he initially closely endorsed the findings of Max Weber 
that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun” and then declared that “from here I take 
culture to those webs” (Geertz, 1973, p.5). Culture, as the 
combination of all these webs, explained Geertz, actually exists 
publically and in the open in everyday life everywhere, and not 
in books, museums, or in the theories regarding “psychological 
structures by means of which individuals or groups of 
individuals guide their behaviour” (Geertz, 1973, p. 10). This 
approach, he stated, would never be able to explain what is 
involved in the act of playing a violin or what the meaning was 
of a trade agreement in the highlands of central Morocco in 
1912. Culture is not a psychological structure or a power, 
“something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or 
processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something 
within which they can be intelligibly — that is, thickly — 
described.” (Geertz, 1972, p. 13). If we continue with this line 
of thought, Geertz explained, we will arrive at the conclusion 
that culture is a set of “extra-genetic, outside-the-skin control 
mechanisms,” most desperately needed by man for the purpose 
of “ordering his behaviour” (Geertz, 1973, p. 8). As such, said 
Geertz, “culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete 
behavior patterns — customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters 
— as has, by and large, been the case up to now, but as a set of 
control mechanisms — plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what 
computer engineers call “programs”) for the governing of 
behaviour” (Geertz, 1973, p. 8). In the absence of these, “man’s 
behaviour would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of 
pointless acts and exploding emotions” (Geertz, 1971, p. 9) that 
would not enable the accumulation of human experience in any 
way. In their absence human beings would move in the world as 
“mental basket cases” to become “unworkable monstrosities 
with very useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and 
no intellect” (Geertz, 1973, p. 11). Culture is not a mere 
ornament of human existence, Geertz concluded, but its 
GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.5 No.2, 2016
©The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
25
existential condition, as witnessed by the fact that man is an 
unfinished or incomplete creature in imperative need of culture, 
enabling him to establish his ideas, values, activities and 
emotions, and to carry them out or implement them in an 
orderly and intelligent manner.  
The Israeli jurist and cultural researcher Manny Mautner 
adopted the analytical position of Geertz and stated that culture 
is a system of meanings through which human beings evaluate 
their identity, their status in society, the content of their lives 
and their purposes. Through these contents human beings define 
their spiritual experiences and their relations with other human 
beings and with the natural world, and define their place in it. 
The contents of culture equip them with a collection of patterns 
that make it possible for them to find their place in the world, to 
organize their behavior and to determine “the limits of the 
intellectual, emotional and ethical world” in which they live 
(Mautner, 2012, p. 42). Culture, according to Mautner, is a 
series of categories of knowledge that give meaning to things 
and determine his relationship with them. In a competitive 
environment, culture is also an asset that offers advantages to 
whoever holds it, or holds enough of it to maintain a political 
hegemony. Finally, culture is a collection of behavioral 
practices from which derives the power to attain their own 
approval on the one hand, while at the same time constituting 
restrictions on their freedom of expression — lest they go too 
far and slip out of control (Mautner, 2012, pp. 57-58). 
The historian Arnold Toynbee viewed culture as a collection 
of “regularities in the internal and external behavior of the 
members of a society, excluding those regularities which are 
clearly hereditary in origin” (Toynbee, 1961, vol. 12, p. 272). 
Within these permanent general patterns of behavior, Toynbee 
included “modes of thinking and feeling and modes of 
behavior,” such as ideas, values, and beliefs (Toynbee, 1961, p. 
273).  
The position that culture is an array of elements that direct 
human behavior was put forward by the Israeli historian Yigal 
Elam. As far as he is concerned, culture is “the artificial 
surroundings that was created by man and contains all things 
created by humans in all aspects, physical and spiritual, 
technological and scientific, ideological and artistic, 
organizational and institutional, that are customary and ethical. 
Its purpose is to allow the existence of human society in 
opposite to nature and in front to rival human societies, and to 
grant control, identity and meaning to this existence” (Elam, 
2012, p. 19). This definition draws its inspiration from a series 
of similar definitions proposed by a number of well-known 
cultural researchers, such as Edward Byron Reuter, who 
declared in 1939 that “the term culture is used to signify the 
sum total of human creations, the organized result of human 
experience up to the present time.” Or, in other words, 
“everything material and immaterial, created by man, in the 
process of living” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1963, pp. 126-127). 
Culture, according to Reuter, is everything that man, as separate 
from the animal world, has done when shaping tools, attitudes 
and beliefs; developing ideas and judgements, codes and 
institutions, arts and sciences, philosophy and social 
organization, including the web of internal relationships that 
link these acts of creation and other aspects of human life. In 
this respect, Reuter went further to explain, all material and 
abstract items that man has created in the course of his existence 
is culture and is thus included in it. 
Israeli cultural and literary researcher, Itamar Even Zohar 
argued that in a commonplace sense culture is “all the 
manifestations of the independent consciousness of society, as it 
has come to be expressed by canonical ideologies,” willing to 
personalize its “truth” (Evan Zohar, 1980, p, 167). Therefore 
culture reflects self-awareness, and hence serves the function of 
evoking a wide range of positions and interests that seek to 
advance these “canonical” ideologies, representative behaviors, 
and full repertoire of values, beliefs, and attitudes, leading them 
towards a hegemonic position. Consequently, it is clear that 
culture is in a constant state of change, tension and power 
struggle that is caused by the clash of opposing interests seeking 
to acquire for themselves a hegemonic status and perpetuate 
their own preferences. In a fundamental way, an outside 
observer, i.e. outside social consciousness, “is not willing to 
acknowledge them or even admit to their existence.” Zohar also 
argued that culture is “all the semiotic possibilities that are 
available to the society (and the individuals within it), that make 
it possible to create the communitive situations that occur within 
it” (Evan Zohar, 1980, pp. 166-167). This definition allows us 
to look at culture not only in a synchronic, horizontal way, 
which only deals with what is happening within a culture at a 
given time, but also in a diachronic, vertical way, which seeks 
to examine the development of culture and the changes that are 
occurring within it from era to era in the course of time.  
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
Until now we have been able to distinguish between 
normative definitions of culture (Arnold, Scruton, Aloni, the 
Catholic Church and in some respects Freud) that see it as the 
height of creativity, morality, spirituality and ethics, placed in 
the hands of a few builders of culture, and descriptive 
definitions of culture, with a much smaller normative content 
but greater practicality (Tylor, Boas, Tuerny-High, Kluckhohn, 
Geertz, Toynbee, Mautner, Elam, Reuter, Even Zohar), and 
which are inclined to give equal importance to the plain and the 
sublime in the works of man, and grant to all of them equal 
status as builders of culture. We have clarified definitions that 
integrate culture with behaviors or contexts where behavioral 
characteristics become permanent habits (Freud, Geertz, 
Kluckhohn). This is in contrast to the definitions that seem to 
view culture as a collection of signs and symbols that include 
within them all the possible meanings that allow an organized 
and regulated human (i.e. cultured) existence (Kluckhohn, Even 
Zohar and even in some degree Geertz ).  
Most definitions postulate that there is a close connection 
between culture and society — the arena that limits and justifies 
culture in its varied and infinite appearances. For some culture 
is a natural phenomenon that is essential for our existence and 
part of our everyday lives, even if we give no second thought to 
it. Others suggest that culture is a creative effort, both ethical 
and spiritual, that through a selective, historical process chooses 
what is to become part and parcel of the human experience. If 
we return to the distinction between the normative and the 
practical approach to culture, we perceive that the former is 
more suspicious of human nature, while the position of the latter 
is more forgiving.  
BACK TO OUR OPENING DEFINITIONS 
In setting forth the various definitions of culture we have 
taken a descriptive approach that combines both its functional 
and structural characteristics. Culture, we have determined, is 
entirely a work of man and his cogitations, and necessary for all 
aspects of his existence, including elements that are pleasurable 
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and worthwhile, and that challenge his existence as such. It is 
subordinated to a person’s individual decisions and choices, and 
completely subjected to his own supervision. On the basis of 
these characteristics, which are apparent in almost all of the 
definitions, we have distinguished three categories that have 
sorted out the myriad contents of culture and bestowed upon 
them a quality status that has determined that all three are 
necessary for our very existence, as the loss of or mortal blow to 
one of them would without doubt imperil our lives.  
An additional fundamental and existential danger is the 
radical violation of the balance between these three categories; 
Life without both internal-personal and external-social 
challenges would be worthless and unbearable. A life in which 
everything is subjugated to an idea or mission, even when of the 
highest value (from silent monasticism to total recruitment to an 
idea, belief, or institution) — as Ibsen’s character Brand (in a 
verse tragedy of the same name) tried to live, or as the sons of 
The Mother of Karl Čapek lived — is dangerous. Dedicating 
one’s life to something, if the aim is solely to ensure one’s 
physical existence — as Walter Faber, Max Frisch’s hero tried 
to do in his Homo Faber: A Report — is an empty deed that will 
result in much damage to oneself and to one’s loved ones. This 
happened to Walter Faber, who mistakingly slept with the 
daughter he had ignored in the past and didn’t know at all; 
discovery of these events prompted her to take her own life.  
We have advocated a descriptive approach for several 
reasons. The first was metaphorically stated by that “monstrous 
woman, solid as a Norman pillar” of the “prole” race in George 
Orwell’s 1984. While hanging out laundry in the inner 
courtyard of her house, she sang in a contralto voice, strong and 
pleasant to the ear, one of the songs composed by the song 
machine, the versificator, for all the unfortunate souls of 
Oceania (Orwell, p. 173): 
It was only an ‘opeless fancy.  
It passed like an Ipril dye [day], 
But a look an’ a word an’ the dreams they stirred! 
They ‘ave stolen my ‘eart awye!  
Winston Smith, Orwell’s protagonist, was touched by the poem, 
“but the woman sang so tunefully as to turn the dreadful rubbish 
into an almost pleasant sound.” In other words, even a woman 
considered to be human waste in Big Brother’s totalitarian state 
Oceania can be a free spirit, despite her miserable life. This 
illustrates the fact that high culture and superb creative effort 
can be found even among those who “don’t really count.” This 
was very clear to artists like Peter Bruegel the Elder, the 
Brothers Grimm, Bedřich Smetana, Johannes Brahms, Frédéric 
Chopin and also to many creators like them, who found their 
inspiration in folk tales, peasant weddings, folk dances, games, 
and music. It was also obvious to a number of distinguished 
anthropologists of the twentieth century, such as Franz Boaz, 
Ruth Benedict, Margaret Reed, Claude Levi-Strauss, Raymond 
Williams, Clifford Geertz, David Schneider and Marshall 
Sahlins. All of them found that cultures that were considered 
primitive in the eyes of the West, often surpassed the West in 
morality and in not a few technological areas (like growing 
plants hydroponically, for example, that was customary in 
Polynesia, the art of navigation, and forms of social and ethical 
organization). One can therefore say that the loftiest of cultures, 
according to the normative approach, may actually be based on 
simplicity, the ordinary, as it is according to the functional and 
descriptive definition of culture.16 
    The second explanation evolves from the previous one, 
founded in the relative attitude to culture, that is evident in our 
definition. In Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the 
Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics Freud has shown how 
cultures solve even their most serious or intimate problems in an 
intelligent manner, without having heard of the Ten 
Commandments or a strict Christian morality (Freud, 1940 
[1913]). A similar view was adopted by Geertz in the case of the 
Jewish merchant Cohen and his relationship with the Barbary 
Marmusha tribe in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco. In the 
shadow of World War II and the unrests in the British colony of 
India, the poet and literary critic T.S. Eliot, a relativistic pioneer, 
stressed the need to respect all cultures “however inferior to our 
own it may appear, or however justly we may disapprove of 
some features of it” (Elliot, 1949, p, 65). “The deliberate 
destruction of another culture as a whole,” Elliot added, “is an 
irreparable wrong, almost as evil as to treat human beings like 
animals” (ibid.).  
Kluckhohn and Kroeber, who investigated cultures through 
their symbols and values a decade later, found that there are no 
cultures that do not seek lofty values of their own. They 
concluded that in order to meet the scope, variation, durability, 
and mutual relations of these cultural values, a relative 
perspective is needed. This reasoning receives verification from 
the discussion that is currently taking place with regard to 
contemporary culture; it points out the great complexity in the 
judgement of “ordinary” people, when they come to choose 
values, ways of thought, attitudes, and ways of behavior from a 
cultural tool kit in order to solidify their positions on issues, 
based on their personal or collective agendas. 
Another possible explanation is based on the uncovering of 
conceptual primes or primitives (D’Andrade, 2001, p. 246), or 
cultural scripts (Wierzbicka, 2002, pp. 401-402).17  These are 
crosscultural approaches that center on human cognition and 
assimilation every step of the way in the building process of 
cultural concepts, values, customary or otherwise. These scripts 
are in fact a series of preliminary value assumptions in relation 
to what is the right thing to do and what is bad and should not 
be done. The origin thereof, as Roy D’Andrade stated, is man’s 
intrinsic wish to be “natural.” This can be seen through the 
semantic forms of metalinguistics, which enable a better 
understanding between languages (Wierzbicka, 2002; 
D’Andrade, 2001). 
An expression of cosmopolitan culture is strong in those who 
enter into fundamental binational humanistic agreements (a 
union of over 50,000 such international agreements exist 
throughout the world) (Hathaway, 2007) — e.g. the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or ICCPR 
(first adopted in 1976), which is the United Nations’ treaty for 
civil rights; or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
16 This is also the lesson Geertz adopted from the incident of a Moroccan Jew 
named Cohen, whom he introduced at the beginning of his book Interpretation 
of Cultures. Geertz also took example from Marshall Sahlins’ interpretation of 
Captain James Cook and his relationship with the residents of Hawaii and its 
leaders. When he first arrived, Cook was crowned as a god; but he was killed a 
year later, during his second visit to the island (Sahlins, 1996, chapter 4, pp.148-
189). 
17 It seems that these new concepts, whether we call them “perceptions” or 
“scripts,” or according to James Scott “transcripts” (Scott, 1990, pp. XII; 
Ginzberg, 2014), are only the equivalent of an old term “ cultural patterns “ or 
elements leading to the consolidation of cultural patterns (Ellwood, 1927). 
GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.5 No.2, 2016
©The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
27
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1981 (first 
adopted in 1976).18 Cooperation in this global endeavor 
(undertaken in a sociocultural framework organized within a 
political entity) illustrates that almost all nations recognize a 
hierarchy of outstanding values, as already hinted at by Ernst 
Cassirer (an adherent of the Roman Stoic philosopher and 
emperor Marcus Aurelius) and are obligated to act accordingly 
(Cassirer, 1954, pp. 23, 93, 279-286). 
It is possible to summarize this point and say that a 
combination of universal human characteristics, “natural” 
cultural scripts, universal value hierarchy, and a willingness to 
strive for political cooperation in a system of international 
alliances and treaties — all of which touch upon different 
aspects of universal human cooperation and principles of 
freedom — propound a civilization with ethical and 
organizational layers that support cultural relativism on the one 
hand, and culture as the fundamental, outstanding center of 
man’s personal and collective enterprise, on the other .19  
Has our definition solved the problem of the multiple existing 
definitions? As far as relative definitions are concerned — 
especially those that emanated from the relativistic school of 
thought, as it initially developed in Berlin and later on in the 
USA, France, and England — it seems possible, at this 
preliminary stage at least, to say that the definition we have 
suggested combines a significant part of the existing definitions 
in the field — in particular those that built their expositions on a 
variegated list of values essential to the existence of mankind, or 
that emphasized categories from the three we suggested — 
mostly the ethical and control categories. Our definition adds an 
analytical dimension to all of these and allows for a more 
accurate identification of the cultural content that is included in 
each category, connecting them in a dynamic manner to cases 
that are defined as (always convoluted and multifaceted) human 
activities. At the same time this categorization indicates what 
we describe as the “equal temperament” of all categories of the 
definition — taste, value, and control — as none is of more, or 
of less, value or importance than any other.  
  This position can explain why mankind creates culture, even 
in the most extreme human circumstances. In all human life, we 
will always find fragments of taste, value, and content that 
glimmer, however miniscule they may be, as they are absolutely 
essential to human performance. 
Can our definition deal with the normative definitions of 
culture? Up until now I have alluded to this through the words 
of the stocky prole, or “monstrous,” woman as Orwell put it, 
who transformed cultural waste into a soulful tune that squeezes 
the heart. Orwell’s prole woman is the twin of all people 
18 A very small number of countries are currently not signatories to these 
documents. Israel is one of the many signatories (Hathaway, 2007). 
19 We cannot expand on the question of civilization and the multifaceted 
distinctions between culture and civilization. We note here the explanation 
given by the sociologist Norbert Elias, according to whom civilization generally 
characterizes human achievement where nations came to fruition in terms of 
identity and boundaries and which can no longer be appealed or disputed. 
Culture, says Elias, can be attributed to nations and companies whose identities 
have not yet been settled and are still in the design process (Elias, 2000, pp. 7). 
Elias’s approach has been referred to by many, for example, the historian Irad 
Malkin, who stated that precisely the great distance between the cities of 
Greece, from the West in the Black Sea to Spain in the East, and the widespread 
commercial connections, and connections through sports, arts, worship, 
statecraft and war, created what is called “Greek civilization” (Malkin, 2014). 
The urban infrastructure of civilization gives some validity to Toynbee’s claim 
that civilization can be viewed as the urban phase of civilization (Toynbee, 
1961). 
humanized by culture and consuming culture in spite of their 
harsh living conditions: the besieged inhabitants of Leningrad 
listening to Shostakovich’s Symphony No.7 while suffering 
from cold and starvation; or a group of Czech women, huddled, 
frozen and hungry, on a dark winter morning, in front of the 
women’s barracks in Auschwitz-Birkenau and quietly singing 
the Czechoslovakian  national anthem. 
These examples remind me of the behavior of musicians, 
storytellers, artists, and ethnographers who went to the people in 
search of content and inspiration for their work. They illustrate 
the reflective, creative urge of a mankind that constructs, 
designs, innovates, improves, mends, and aspires, creates and 
continuously improves in all areas. 
Does all of this not suffice to convince us that the distance 
between sublime culture and the simple and the seemingly 
inconsequential in man’s works is not that great? Was the 
distance really so great between the blacksmith who arose early, 
in the middle of the night, to go to his workshop and the Gaon 
(genius) of Vilna (Rabbi Elijah ben Solomon Zalman), who 
lived opposite him and punctiliously arose early to avoid being 
shamed, as the folk tale tells us? “Somebody has worked on 
this,” Che Guevara once said to a man who asked why he 
smoked the splendid Cuban cigar until it singed his lips. The 
creations of Beethoven were heard, the moment the public 
learned to digest them, in every Viennese salon that respected 
itself, but the great composer was just a “nobody” with no social 
standing. 
THE METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION 
How can we interpret and apply the definition we have set 
forth? Actually we set out from a starting point similar to that of 
Freud and not so distant from that of Tylor. Then we spread out 
a categorical matrix that required the organization of all the 
characteristics of culture in a rational and realistic form, open to 
simple empiric observation. The main methodological 
contribution of our definition is that it clarifies the boundaries of 
discussion and its framework. In this way it allows us to cope 
with other cultural definitions. It provides us with a basis for the 
development of a theory of culture that reflects our position on 
human nature, man’s consciousness and emotions, as well as the 
essence of society and its position vis-à-vis culture. This theory 
emphasizes the entire cultural content, the patterns of cultural 
development and the quality of its architects, the ramifications 
of social activities, their connection to the surroundings, and 
their raison d’être. Methodologically, this definition obligates 
researchers to mention not only the origin of their research (be it 
concept, procedure, process, appearance, relationship, or 
pattern), but also the categories where the object of their 
research is situated. This points to the framework within which 
the concept will be discussed and tested, and which will allow 
for the formulation of appropriate hypothesizes.  
To this, we will now add an additional dimension that sees 
culture as a place of contradictions, and not necessarily as a 
whole. The Aztecs viewed their anthropophagical, cannibalistic 
ceremonies as acts of dual meaning: recognition of the honor 
and prestige granted to the warrior who caught the prisoner who 
was to be sacrificed, and had “developed a taste” for human 
flesh. When the Spanish conquerors reached America, they 
were horrified by this custom, but had no compunctions about 
setting their Mastiff and Greyhound dogs on terrified children, 
or on women with children (Varner & Varner, 1983). During 
World War II twelve policemen and one low-ranking officer 
from Reserve Police Batallion 101 came forward to protest 
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when they were confronted with what was the mission of their 
infamous unit in the Lublin area in Poland, as Christopher 
Browning discovered in his research on this brigade (Browning, 
1992, pp. 56-57). They did so because of their humanistic 
values and the opportunity the commander of the brigade gave 
those who opposed their mission. Facing them was a group of 
policemen, from within the ranks of the remaining five hundred, 
who repeatedly insisted that their special mission of pursuing 
and slaughtering Jews be carried out to the letter. All of them — 
the devout human-hunting Christian Spaniards, the Aztecs who 
sacrificed and ate their victims while building a beautiful 
floating city (Tenochtitlán); both the humane and the inhumane 
Germans — were cultured people and culture builders. All were 
free to choose their raison d’être, their values and ways of 
dealing with the challenges they had to face throughout their 
lives. Similarly, the approach we propose to culture is capable 
of dealing with these profound contradictions, because it takes 
into consideration opposing interests, values, and methods of 
control.  
Another contribution of our definition is the accurate analysis 
it allows us of all categories of cultural structuring. The 
assumption is that all cultures are built, consolidated, mature 
and continuously develop in the course of time. This makes it 
possible for us to acknowledge the connection between all 
activities of institutional structuring and the private ones, as we 
shall see in the following example. After the Aztecs declared 
their independence from the domination of strong Toltec cities 
of the Mexican valley, in the year 1427, they made a dramatic, 
concerted effort to become truly independent and erase all 
memory and sign of the original Chichimeca (i.e. savage) 
culture. This was accomplished by burning all books and 
destroying all monuments that commemorated their humble 
origins, before the valley of Mexico was infiltrated in 1215 and 
the following 200 years of total subordination to the cultured 
and strong Toltec cities of the valley. After they had gained 
their freedom, a new cosmology was created and new myths 
invented. A lengthy series of beliefs, customs, institutions, 
contents, ceremonies, functions and boundaries of orientation in 
both time and space was consolidated. This created, simply and 
effectively, a brand new culture, pretentiously hegemonic and 
imperial, both on the “national” and the heavenly scale (the 
Aztecs took upon themselves the protectorate of the fifth sun). 
Needless to add that this culture was very successful  
A similar process occurred in all societies and civilizations 
known to us. Nationalism, for example, the most ambitious 
modern ideology, involved building anew all existing human 
societies around the concept of an at times vague nationality, at 
times quite implausible, yet essential for its actualization. In 
terms of the process of construction, the works of men are 
purposeful, well thought out, loaded with the multilevelled 
participation of both institutions and independent elements; it is 
immediately evident that all parts of this construction are easily 
identifiable within the framework of the three categories we 
have suggested.  
The building of the Zionist Israeli culture, for example, 
required a series of historical justifications and a policy 
formulated and composed by a few individuals, institutions and 
conventions. At the same time, active policy-making institutions 
and both economic and infrastructural organizations were 
founded (the Jewish trade unions, Jewish Agency, Jewish 
National Fund, national bank, Zionist Agency, the Chief 
Rabbinate, defense forces, workers’ cooperatives, means of 
transportation, production and marketing, hospitals and clinics, 
frameworks for the purchase and settlement of real estate, and 
others). Institutions of culture and entertainment were 
established (e.g. the Hebrew University, the Technion [an Israeli 
institute of technology], Hebrew educational system, teacher’s 
unions, theaters and music conservatories, coffee houses, 
resorts, beaches, publishing houses, sport organizations and 
facilities, a writers guild). Standards had to be established (e.g. 
for housing — using only Jerusalem stone for building in 
Jerusalem, for example — in forestation, nature and wildlife 
preservation, observance of holidays, political activities, work 
hours, what is holy and what is secular). Composers used 
melodies from their countries of origin or composed original 
Hebrew songs and tunes. Novelists, playwrights and 
choreographers created works of art. People of vision and 
initiative founded cities, villages, and communal settlements. 
Others journeyed to Africa in search of the descendants of the 
ten lost tribes (and found them); still others travelled as 
emissaries and set up preparatory farms for future settlers, or 
left Israel to study important and necessary professions for 
building a country and to train themselves as professionals. In 
this way the gradual building and development of the Hebrew 
culture and Israeli society led to the creation of the Jewish State. 
With similar variations other societies and states were born.20   
In my essay I have recapped the interesting directions 
followed by contemporary social and cultural researchers. We 
found that many of them (including Swidler, DiMaggio, and 
Vaisey) dealt with the choices man makes in different situations 
and asked what people draw from their cultural toolkit to make 
these decisions. The categories at the center of our definition 
allow a more accurate examination of this process and its 
cognitive and emotional dimensions, because every choice 
certainly relates to one of the categories. When we understand 
relationships between categories, we can accurately identify the 
process of making that choice and predict where it will lead. By 
requiring a system of checks and balances in the entirety of the 
cultural parts organized analytically within the categories we 
have suggested, we have opened an opportunity for examining 
the cultural repercussions on human behavior — normal or 
perverted, public or private, individual or national, civil or 
political. 
CONCLUSION 
The process that we have examined in this essay and the 
methods used show that deciphering the term culture is still 
incomplete. We still have many as we are still facing numerous 
questions. I presented some of the most important and 
profound/complex ones . Firstly, culture and the concept that 
defines it are capable of including the entire complexity of 
human life — historical and contemporary — and at the same 
time supply the “scripts” for all future human endeavors? Isn’t 
our project pretentiously philosophic, literal or generally 
academic (that which gave birth to as well, as we have seen, the 
concept of culture), but actually have no real expectation?21  An 
20 A fascinating example is the enormously complex and decisive  creation of 
Singapore as a state after its independence in 1965 and even earlier, since being 
received self government in 1959 — as narrated in detail by Lee Kuan Yew, the 
first Singaporean Prime Minister (1959-1992), in his political autobiography 
From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000, New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2000. 
21 This is indeed the opinion of Kuper, who states that culture does not provide 
scripts for everything, but that not all ideas are post factum thoughts (Kuper, 
1999, pp. 199). 
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additional question is, after we have stated our relative position: 
How can we explain the great differences between cultures?  Is 
it even possible to discuss cultures without comparative 
judgement?  After we have determined that mankind is a 
plethora of creativity, how have we managed to reach such 
levels of evil and malevolence in the world?  The final question, 
are we nevertheless capable, despite all the known hardships 
dividing us, to unite all of humanity to “The Great Conversation 
which is trying to conquer loneliness, ignorance and disorder” 
(Postman, 1993, pp. 186-187)? To a large extent, can this 
undertaking stand firm within the framework of a monumental 
undertaking of education and integrated multidisciplinary in-
depth knowledge, in a wealth of values and respect for 
knowledge. An enterprise stable against any short cuts, 
substitutes, scientific or statistical facilitations, any concepts, 
ideas, theological or other that modern technology  has lured us 
to lower our stature, and raise humanity to a higher, if not the 
hights possible level of being an ideal society? 
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